References to check:
Secret-Key Capacity Regions for Multiple Enrollments With an SRAM-PUF → 2019
Security of helper data schemes for SRAM-PUF in multiple enrollment scenarios → 2017
A Spatial Majority Voting Technique to Reduce Error Rate of Physically Unclonable Functions → 2013
Important! Analysis of Naive SMV
Since the PUF results are random and exhibit little bias, a single flip in the bits with the majority value will overturn the result of majority voting.
Memory-based PUFs are vulnerable as well: A non-invasive attack against SRAM PUFs
Hamming weight distribution (theory)
PUF KEY RECOVERING USING BRUTE -FORCE ATTACK
https://www.mdpi.com/2079-9268/7/1/2
Temporal Majority Voting (TMV) Error Probability formula
(nice definition of symbols)
Error probability (upper bound) of the author’s proposed voter (called UP/DOWN Counter), defined as:
The expected number of trials needed by the UP/DOWN counter to reach a decision state [28] can be derived as (relevant!)
An SRAM-based PUF with a capacitive digital preselection for a 1E-9 key error probability \^
Error probability formulas for TMV, BCH
not very relevant: A Novel Security Key Generation Method for SRAM PUF Based on Fourier Analysis
(check ChatGPT answer)
