Theoretical Analysis of SRAM PUF

References to check:

• book: Physical Unclonable Functions in Theory and Practice

• (can be useful) book: Entropy analysis of physical unclonable functions

• (check ChatGPT answer also)

• Secret-Key Capacity Regions for Multiple Enrollments With an SRAM-PUF → 2019

• On the Entropy of Physically Unclonable Functions → 2016

• A Proof of Concept SRAM-based Physically Unclonable Function (PUF) Key Generation Mechanism for IoT Devices → 2019

  • used in https://crystalfree.atlassian.net/wiki/spaces/SaraPhD/pages/2889187334

• Security of helper data schemes for SRAM-PUF in multiple enrollment scenarios → 2017

• Helper-less physically unclonable functions and chip authentication → 2014

• Theoretical Limits of Helperless Stabilizers for Physically Unclonable Constants → 2014

  • journal version of Helper-less physically unclonable functions and chip authentication

• Memory Leakage-Resilient Encryption based on Physically Unclonable Functions

  • cited by Helper-less physically unclonable functions and chip authentication

  • very good theoretical background on TMV, Dark Bit (DB), TMV-DB

• A soft decision helper data algorithm for SRAM PUFs → 2009

  • cited by Helper-less physically unclonable functions and chip authentication for the statistical model

  • cited by Theoretical Limits of Helperless Stabilizers for Physically Unclonable Constants as a reference for SRAM PUF statistical description

• A Spatial Majority Voting Technique to Reduce Error Rate of Physically Unclonable Functions → 2013

  • Important! Analysis of Naive SMV

    • Since the PUF results are random and exhibit little bias, a single flip in the bits with the majority value will overturn the result of majority voting.

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• Memory-based PUFs are vulnerable as well: A non-invasive attack against SRAM PUFs

  • Hamming weight distribution (theory)

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  • PUF KEY RECOVERING USING BRUTE -FORCE ATTACK

• On Improving Reliability of SRAM-Based Physically Unclonable Functions

  • Temporal Majority Voting (TMV) Error Probability formula

  • (nice definition of symbols)

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  • Error probability (upper bound) of the author’s proposed voter (called UP/DOWN Counter), defined as:

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  • The expected number of trials needed by the UP/DOWN counter to reach a decision state [28] can be derived as (relevant!)

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• An SRAM-based PUF with a capacitive digital preselection for a 1E-9 key error probability \^

  • (I checked the paper in a fast way, the authors use a non-standard SRAM design with capacitive tilt)

  • Error probability formulas for TMV, BCH

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• Cherry-Picking Reliable PUF Bits With Differential Sequence Coding

  • Theory behind typical sets

  • Error Event 1 (Lack of Reliable PUF Bits) and Error Event 2 (Helper Data Overflow) formulas

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    • This work theoretically analyze the relationship between the block size and the reliability of PUF response blocks. In particular, we analyze the effect of the block length on the distribution of reliable PUF bits within each block using the information theoretical concept of typicality.

• Helper Data Algorithms for PUF-Based Key Generation: Overview and Analysis | IEEE Journals & Magazine | IEEE Xplore

  • post-processing by helper data algorithms (HDAs) is indispensable to meet the stringent key requirements: reproducibility, high-entropy, and control.

  • (the paper is very rich in theoretical proofs - can be useful)

• Fuzzy Extractors: How to Generate Strong Keys from Biometrics and Other Noisy Data

  • formal definitions and efficient secure techniques for
    – turning biometric information into keys usable for any cryptographic application, and
    – reliably and securely authenticating biometric data

• not very relevant: A Novel Security Key Generation Method for SRAM PUF Based on Fourier Analysis